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> Upshot • Gash describes some very in-
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teresting and exemplary work using RCinfluenced research and practices. I worry that his third stage of a three-stage
emergence of constructivist epistemology in the study of cognitive development
is consistent with a distinction between
focus on individual cognitive development and focus on knowledge not in the
mind but in the group, inconsistent with
RC. An alternative is given and the issue
of an RC perspective on social justice is
discussed.

« 1 » In his target article “Constructing
Constructivism,” Hugo Gash provides us
with an important perspective on the influence of RC on research and practice in education. In §4 he suggests we might think in
terms “of stages in the emergence of the constructivist epistemology.” This is one possible view, but I would like to suggest that the
apparent distinction between the individual
and the social, as it is typically made, is not
consistent with RC.
« 2 » In §29 Gash uses the phrase: “social construction of knowledge.” Normally,
in educational literature, it is used with a Vygotskian perspective. But Lev Vygotski was
not RC and neither are his advocates now.
(Dykstra 2009: 194–199) Yet in §10 Gash
suggests:
When a researcher emphasises the individual
“construction,
the social side remains a part of the
context; and alternatively, when the social context
is emphasised, the individual interpretation plays
a critical role.

”

His §10 sounds more consistent with RC
than his §29, but in §10 there is still the
“social context” as distinguished from “individual construction” or “individual interpretation,” as if the “social context” is a kind of
given for all while the individual constructions are personal. This is an example of
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how this language is not consistent with RC.
Each of us has to construct our understandings of social contexts, just as we have to do
so about why an object appears to move.
« 3 » In §§12–21 we find descriptions
of research on students’ conceptions of others and the notion that students can change
their conceptions of others. This is much
more like RC. In this respect, Gash’s target
article seems to pull the reader back and
forth between a view that is RC and one
that is not. It is not easy to free oneself from
language that is not RC. This may be part of
what is going on in Gash, but we are writing
in a venue for trying to clarify our RC thinking for ourselves and others.
« 4 » Jean Piaget was firmly against the
notion that development was constituted
of an accumulation of learnings. Instead,
he maintained that each learning is a function of the current development of the individual (Piaget 1964: 171). In the Proceedings
of the First Annual Symposium of the Jean
Piaget Society, Piaget talks about the factors
that influence development (Piaget 1972).
To summarize, he indicates three classical factors that play a role in development:
maturation, experience, and social interaction. However, he maintains that these three
alone cannot explain development without
a fourth factor, equilibration. Equilibration
explains the changes that constitute psychological and cognitive development. There is
a coordination between the first three factors that is a kind of dynamic equilibrium.
In addition, in the construction of new cognitive operations, there is an iterative trialand-error process, which uses the results of
the previous trial to inform the generation
of a new trial (Piaget 1972: 14). The results
of a trial are anticipated on the basis of existing cognitive operations and models of the
world. When the results are not what was
anticipated, the trial has resulted in an error, which gives rise to speculative changes
in the cognitive operations and/or models
for a new trial. The search for a resolution
to the disequilibration ultimately results in a
new equilibrium, cognitive operations, and/
or models of the world for which trials do
not result in errors, at least for a while.
« 5 » In his discussion of the experiential factor in development, Piaget suggests
there are two kinds of experience (Piaget
1972: 7). One is the effect on our nervous

systems by objects, and events involving objects, in the physical world. The other kind
of experience is our manipulations of objects, in effect experiences of objects in the
mind. A simple example is having a number
of objects and choosing to line them up and
count them. One might then decide to count
them in the other direction. Lining the objects up, counting them, and then counting
them in the opposite direction are not properties of the objects themselves. To line them
up and count them are mental inventions,
hence, experiences with objects of the mind.
« 6 » Human beings are cognizing entities in a person’s world. They are much more
complex and much less passive than most
physical objects in our constructed realities. However, just as with physical objects,
we each must construct mental models
of those around and important to us. One
can argue that in the experiments Gash describes, students are engaged in constructing more effective models of other human
beings. At one level this is no different than
constructing a more effective mental model
of a bicycle. However, with a bicycle, if one
subjects it to a certain set of conditions, it
will always behave a certain way, as will all
bicycles made to be the same. Not so with
human beings. They are so complex and
subtle, it is virtually impossible to establish
the same conditions twice.
« 7 » Luckily, we can discern patterns
in the behaviors of human beings. These
patterns are our first foothold into making mental constructs to associate with
other human beings. Culture has a powerful effect on the behavior of human beings,
giving more footholds on making mental
constructs to associate with those around
us. Culture provides us with one more tool,
language. Language gives us a very powerful tool for both giving and receiving feedback as we experience others. Language, and
therefore culture, also has effects on how we
think as we are mentally constructing our
models of the world around us.
« 8 » The stances of both Piaget and
Glasersfeld with respect to our fellow human beings are to treat all as epistemic entities. We acknowledge that each of us bears
the responsibility to make the most effective
constructions of our worlds, but that these
constructions will not necessarily all be the
same as our own. We know that, apparently,
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some have started more recently than us
and others seem to have stopped their constructions of their worlds.7 In both cases,
language is the tool for interaction, engaging others in continuing in or getting back
to the construction process. This respect for
others as epistemic beings is a fundamental
element of social justice as the practice of
and an outcome of RC.
« 9 » It can be argued that we have three
kinds of experience: physical, mental, and
social.8 We could argue that there is some
kind of hierarchy composed of these three
kinds of experience, temporal or of com7 | By “stopped their constructions of their
worlds,” I am referring to the second of two basic
options one has in the presence of a disequilibration. This option is to choose to avoid resolving
the disequilibration. It is as if one is walking away
from it and hoping it will not arise again. I believe that one can choose to live a life in which
only minor refinements or adjustments to one’s
mental models are called for. This involves carefully choosing what inputs to immerse oneself
in. I have certainly seen students who seem to
be operating in this way. Because not all instructors are there just to present information, as these
students believe school is all about, these students
justify the low grades they earn by the claim that
the instructor did not do a proper job. This, I admit, is a kind of resolution to the uncomfortable
situation of a bad grade, but there is no change in
understanding on their part about what school is
about, nor is there any change in understanding
about any phenomena that were the subject of the
course. Could these students change? Of course,
but it is clear that the process will take more than
one semester’s worth of exposure to this alternative to just being lectured at in college.
8 | At the deepest level there is only experience. Signals into the brain from the eyes are indistinguishable from signals coming to the brain
from the ears or other sensory organs. Since, for
example, the quality “red” is not apparent in these
signals, red is apparently produced in the brain
instead of coming into the brain from the “outside
world” through the eyes. We are left with the conclusion that everything we construct as our world,
we construct in response to these indistinguishable signals. Each of us organizes all these things
our brains generate; thus it is we, the observers
of these experiences, who decide to categorize
experiences into types such as physical, mental,
and social. Thus, these types of experience are our
constructions and are not ontological.

plexity, but such arguments are probably
neither productive nor solvable. It is apparent that school and culture should engage
students in constructing ever more effective reasoning patterns and models of how
the world (including other human beings)
works. But, is this what is happening?
« 10 » Unfortunately, we have known
that schooling is not engaging students in
constructing more powerful reasoning patterns and constructions of the world since
at least the 1970s. When the work of Piaget
and his colleagues was introduced into science education in the US, people started trying to assess the stages in the development
of reasoning in their students. Early on this
was done using interviews modelled after
those of Piaget and using paper-and-pencil
puzzles, which grew out of the kinds of tasks
Piaget’s group were using. In the mid-1970s
it appeared that about 1/3 of people were
still displaying reasoning at the level of concrete operations, about 1/3 were displaying
reasoning at the level of formal operations,
and the remaining 1/3 were sometimes
displaying concrete operations when formal operations were appropriate and other
times displaying formal operations. It also
was documented that these proportions did
not appear to change in in any significant
way from the ages of about 13 to 45 (Arons
& Karplus 1976: 396). Clearly, schooling
through college and culture were not resulting in further increases in the proportion
displaying formal operations. Yet it is possible for human beings to have developed
formal operations by the age of 18. There is
no evidence that this situation is different
today.
« 11 » At the same time, physicists reading the work of Paget and his group noticed
in the interview transcripts that not only
could one see evidence of the reasoning the
subjects were doing, but one could also see
evidence of how the subjects thought the
phenomenon in the interview task worked.
This gave rise to a large quantity of work
investigating students’ conceptions of the
phenomena studied in physics and other
science classes. Two important findings of
this work are:
1 | Students come to class with strongly
held conceptions of the phenomena that
do not match what their instructors are
telling them.

2 | Standard instruction results in no real
change in the students’ conceptions of
the phenomena.
Schooling appears to have no effect on either
development of reasoning or on students’
understanding of the phenomena.
« 12 » One can ask why this is the case, if
these results are widely available? Of course,
if teachers are trained in the conventional
methods, they teach as they were taught and
trained to teach. One way to explain the situation is that standard instruction is couched
in a paradigm that promotes neither development of reasoning nor conceptual development. Paradigms define what is appropriate, what questions can be asked, and what
questions are not asked. In the following,
this standard instructional paradigm and an
RC alternative will be described.

Paradigm one: prevalent in most
standard instruction

« 13 » Schooling in this paradigm is
about transmitting knowledge considered
important by the culture to young members of the culture. While it is not explicitly
taught, one of the lessons most thoroughly
absorbed is a view of categories of students
in school, a kind of caste system, which is
then translated to their views of the world
outside of school.
« 14 » Teaching under this paradigm becomes the presentation of the official canons
of the culture by approved methods. Students are tested on how well they can give
back the knowledge presented and skills at
which they have drilled and practiced. Students who do not do well in such tests are assumed not to be members of the upper caste
in school. The descriptions of the characteristics of the castes of students are in terms of
mental ability or “gifts,” thus not under the
control of the teachers. Students who do not
do well are at the mercy of their own genes
and upbringing, both of which are out of the
teachers’ hands. In essence, the victims of
the paradigm one pedagogy are blamed for
their failures. When the teacher has presented the official knowledge by an approved
method, then the teacher’s responsibility has
been successfully discharged.
« 15 » A more complete description of
teaching in this paradigm is “the presentation of the established canon by approved
methods for the benefit of the deserving”

http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/9/3/302.gash
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(Dykstra 2005: 54). The students who have
the requisite mental capacities and diligence
of work characteristics count among the
deserving because they can appropriately
repeat back what the teacher has presented.
This deserving group is considered elite and
superior. The rest are the lower caste, the undeserving.
« 16 » This folk theory of teaching described in the previous paragraph is unchallenged. It has little to do with cognitive and
intellectual development. In fact, it appears
to retard such development and promote the
caste system. These “lower caste” students
are subjected to a social injustice that is unfortunately pervasive in our culture.

Paradigm two: consistent with RC
and socially just

« 17 » In the second paradigm, all hu-

man beings are understood to construct for
themselves working models of the world
around them. These models enable them to
function in the world. These models constitute their understanding of their world.
Because these models are constructed in
their minds, the conceptual entities of which
the models are constructed are only in the
realm of the mental.9 Since in this paradigm
9 | There is often a discussion on this issue
about the existence of the conceptual entities in
the “real” world. The argument goes: If we cannot know the “truth” of our theories, then is it not
possible that a theory could be “true” even though
we do not know it? The question is couched in
the realist point of view. In RC, we know that we
make up our theories to fit our experience. When
they are found to fit experience and predict the
outcome of future tests, the best we can say is that
a theory fits experience and has predicted future
tests accurately. We cannot say such theories are
closer to some truth or “mind independent reality.” It is a trivial constructivism to believe that
our constructed explanations describe or might
describe what is “actually” going on or actually exists. In the sciences, we know from history that we
have experienced a sequence of explanations of
most phenomena. Each time we thought we finally knew what a phenomenon really was, we found
that the seemingly “solid” theory failed to explain
certain new experiences. It seems the height of realist hubris to believe that now we finally know the
“true” explanation. It is certainly not RC. Hence, I
believe that the sentence “end noted” here can also
appropriately be written: Because these models are
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no distinctions are made between human
beings in this theory of the development of
understanding, there are no class and racial
undertones.
« 18 » Further, in this paradigm it is observed that human beings are motivated to
adjust their models when their expectations
based on the models fail to be compatible
with their experiences in the world. This
is the trial-and-error process mentioned
earlier in this commentary. There is utility
in models that fit experience and predictions of future experiences. Human beings
are driven by a need to have their models fit
their experiences.
« 19 » Schooling becomes something
entirely different in this paradigm. Instead
of “giving” the canon to students, the goal is
to engage them in constructing new models
of the world or revising existing ones, i.e.,
deepening, strengthening, and expanding
their understandings of their worlds. In a
sense there is nothing to present, because
understanding is constructed in and exists
only in the mind. As such, understanding cannot be presented or transmitted.
Students can only construct their understandings for themselves. As students are
constructing new models for themselves in
concert with others, they are also developing
new reasoning patterns.
« 20 » What is a teacher to do in this
paradigm? An appropriate goal would be
for students to leave having developed a
different, more powerful understanding of
the phenomena under study than they had
when they started. Since human beings adjust their understandings of the world when
existing understandings fail to fit their experiences, then a teacher’s task is to engage students in situations in which they are likely
to notice a mismatch between their mental
models of their world and their experiences. This mismatch between one’s personal
mental models and personal experience,
when one perceives it, is called disequilibration. The teacher’s job then is disequilibration. This is in contrast to the paradigm one
teacher, where the teacher’s job is to make
the “deserving” students comfortable.

constructed in their minds, the conceptual entities
of which the models are made do not exist outside
of the mind.

« 21 » To accomplish this task a teacher
needs two things, after first buying into the
RC view. One is to have effective models of
the students’ understandings of their worlds,
their initial conceptions. These enable the
teacher to imagine how students might react
to various possible experiences that might
be introduced into the instructional setting.
This is what Gash is describing in §16. The
other is an extensive knowledge of possible
experiences that might not conform to the
mental models or cognitive constructs of the
students.
« 22 » Gash seems to be saying something similar:
A constructivist approach was not one that
“prescribed
what the teachers and student teachers
presented to the children in primary schools during these interventions. Instead, researchers asked
questions and provided counter-examples to challenge children’s ideas about the topic. (§15)

”

« 23 » To paraphrase Gash in §10: The
emphasis in paradigm two is on the student/experience interface instead of on the
teacher/student interface, which is central in
paradigm one.

Conclusion

« 24 » I have pointed out that social
interaction can be considered a type of experience that influences cognitive and psychological development in a way consistent
with RC. One pitfall of considering social
interaction as different from experience of
the physical world is the introduction of the
idea of a kind of knowledge that is a phenomenon of the social group, outside of
mind. This notion of knowledge is counter
to a basic premise of RC that knowledge exists only in the mind.
« 25 » I have also illustrated how the social injustice of convincing students they are
not among an elite class of “deserving” students perpetrated by paradigm-one schooling can be avoided by shifting to the RCbased paradigm two. We know that social
injustice is perpetrated against students on
the basis of race and economic class, but not
so obvious is the caste system of deserving
vs. non-deserving in almost every classroom
in the realist paradigm one.
« 26 » For all of the valuable research
he describes, Gash has left us with a picture
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concerning social interaction distinguished
from experience with our physical worlds
that is not clearly RC. We are not engaging
our readers in constructing understanding
of RC effectively when the language we use
too easily implies something other than
RC.
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Author’s Response:
Perspectives on RC
and Teaching
Hugh Gash
> Upshot • In response to the issues

raised in the OPCs, I emphasize the following aspects: teaching cannot be
transmitting knowledge, stages are too
constraining a model, RC focuses on
the individual construction and talking
about social context invites the spectre
of social constructivism.
« 1 » My target article “Constructing

Constructivism” is about a narrow selection of either personal educational applications of RC experience or of constructivist research undertaken by colleagues. I
welcome the challenges in the careful and
thoughtful comments in these OPCs and I
am very grateful to all the authors for their
comments. As RC is a theory of knowledge,
issues raised in the OPCs investigate the
interpretation of RC epistemology and RC
teaching, deepen ideas presented and raise
important interpretive questions. The comments are discussed in sections on teaching
and epistemology, the place of the social,
trivialising constructivism and psychological issues. There are also a number of suggestions for the future.

Teaching and epistemology

« 2 » Education plays a central role in

the continuity of culture and knowledge. If,
however, we say teaching plays an important role in the transmission of culture and
knowledge, then the RC position is compromised by the metaphor “transmission.” This
metaphor is commonplace, and Janet Bowers
and her colleagues (§3), Arne Engström (§§2–
4), Theo Hug (§5) and Thomas McCloughlin
(§§5f) have each raised interpretive issues
about teaching and its relation to RC in their
OPCs.
« 3 » RC was introduced as a call for
epistemological clarity in relation to Jean
Piaget’s theory (Glasersfeld 1974). Ernst
von Glasersfeld agreed with Nell Noddings’s
characterisation of RC as a post-epistemology (Engström §3), but it remains an epistemology, being concerned with the nature
and limits of knowledge. So while an epistemology cannot prescribe teaching methods,
and while epistemological educational and
psychological issues can be examined separately and in isolation, it is fruitful for insights in associated domains to cross boundaries and influence relevant neighbouring
disciplines. It is important that the identity
of the form of information (epistemological, educational) does not become a block to
the possibility of exploring implications and
relations between the domains. Also, the relationship we have to knowledge at any moment influences our relationship to our own
cognitive processes and to the person(s) to
whom we are talking. If we are startled, we
may be caught off guard and less circumspect. If we are outraged, we may want to
impose our Reality. It is notoriously difficult
to respect alternative realities when they violate our own boundaries and expectations.
In Humberto Maturana’s (1988) terms, we
orient to either objectivity-without-parenthesis or objectivity-in-parenthesis. Objectivity-in-parenthesis is when one recognises
that objectivity is an illusion as there cannot
be a match between reality and experience,
consistent with RC, and one accepts responsibility for the concepts one uses to model
experience. Objectivity-without-parenthesis
is when one believes that knowledge is about
matching what one knows with reality, reality is separate and the goal of knowledge is
to represent reality. We position ourselves as
separate from reality in objectivity-without-

parenthesis or as connected in objectivityin-parenthesis. People are never in greater
moral danger than when they believe they
have the truth.
« 4 » RC teaching is where the teacher
is sensitive to the process of construction
in the learner with all the possibilities this
awareness poses for considering alternative interpretations in the learner and in
the teacher’s view of the learner. RC teaching is firmly in the domain of objectivityin-parenthesis and valuing process. Using
RC as a model of knowing requires putting
teachers, pupils, knowledge, teaching, learning and all other categories used describing
education in parenthesis, together with the
links between categories. So in writing in an
RC context, care is needed by the writer and
reader to come to common understandings.
« 5 » If learning is about requiring the
child to learn what the teacher knows, about
learning about Reality, then the process the
learner uses is irrelevant. An alternative view
from the learner is an error. However, we
might want to talk about the teacher’s teaching as though it were divorced from learning, for example, to make some point about
the activity of teaching. Teaching remains
a process that is interactive with learners
and ceases when the learners have stopped
attending. As William Glasser (1986) indicated, teaching becomes very difficult when
the learners have decided that they do not
want to learn.
« 6 » I agree that the word “teaching”
has connotations that what is learned is
passed directly from the teacher to the pupil (Bowers et al. §3) and so runs counter
to the need within an RC perspective to
sidestep this commonplace meaning. This
is why many now prefer the phrase “teaching-learning.” An alternative in the wider
educational community is to use the word
“teaching” and explain what this means for
a constructivist teacher.
« 7 » Dewey Dykstra (§§13–16) outlined a
traditional educational approach (paradigm
one) that he contrasted with an RC-based
paradigm two. I think some of the difficulties with the concept of RC teaching may
be alleviated by Dykstra’s presentation of RC
teaching in his second paradigm (§§17–23)
and I agree with his interpretation of some of
the probable effects of the RC-based teaching model. McCloughlin (§6) also emphasises
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